Property: Cases and Materials
- Cribbet, Findley, Smith, Dzienkowski
- 9th Edition
- ISBN: 978-1-59941-252-8
| Page | Case Name | Citation | Court | Audio |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 124 | Armory v. Delamirie | 1 Strange 505 | King's Bench, 1722 |  Download |
| 1210 | Brown v. Lober | 389 N.E.2d 1188 | Supreme Court of Illinois, 1979 | Download |
| 855 | Dolan v. City of Tigard | 512 U.S. 374 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1994 | Download |
| 217 | Gruen v. Gruen | 496 N.E.2d 869 | Court of Appeals of New York, 1986 | Download |
| 129 | Hannah v. Peel | K.B. 509 | King's Bench Division, 1945 | Download |
| 932 | Hickey v. Green | 445 N.E.2d 156 | Appeals Court of Massachusetts, 1982 | Download |
| 85 | Johnson v. M'Intosh | 21 U.S. 543 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1823 | Download |
| 792 | Kelo v. City of New London | 545 U.S. 469; 125 S. Ct. 2655 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2005 | Download |
| 808 | Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. | 458 U.S. 419 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1982 | Download |
| 836 | Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council | 505 U.S. 1003 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1992 | |
| 131 | McAvoy v. Medina | 93 Mass. 548 | Supreme Court of Massachusetts, 1866 | Download |
| 27 | Moore v. Regents of the University of California | 793 P.2d 479 | Supreme Court of California, 1990 | Download |
| 628 | Neponsit Property Owners' Association, Inc. v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank | 15 N.E.2d 793 | Court of Appeals of New York, 1938 | Download |
| 849 | Nollan v. California Costal Commission | 483 U.S. 825 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1987 | |
| 156 | O'Keefe v. Snyder | 416 A.2d 862 | Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1980 | Download |
| 868 | Palazzolo v. Rhode Island | 533 U.S. 606 | Supreme Court of the United States, 2001 | |
| 820 | Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York | 438 U.S. 104 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1978 | Download |
| 811 | Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon | 260 U.S. 393 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1922 | Download |
| 642 | Sanborn v. McLean | 206 N.W. 496 | Supreme Court of Michigan, 1925 | Download |
| 685 | Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co. | 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 | Supreme Court of Arizona, 1972 | Download |
| 36 | State v. Shack | 277 A.2d 369 | Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1971 | Download |
| 634 | Tulk v. Moxhay | 2 Phillips 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 | Court of Chancery, England, 1848 | Download |
| 890 | Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas | 416 U.S. 1 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1974 | Download |
| 753 | Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty co. | 272 U.S. 365 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1926 | Download |
| 565 | Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist | 498 P.2d 987 | Supreme Court of California, 1972 | Download |
| Case Information | Fact Summary | Rule of Law |
|---|---|---|
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Armory v. Delamirie King's Bench, 1722 1 Strange 505 Pg. 124 |
Chimney Sweep found a jewel and took it to a goldsmith for appraisal. The goldsmith offered the sweep a small amount of money for the jewel. The sweep refused the money and demanded the jewel back. The goldsmith refused and the sweep brought suit. | The finder of property does not have an absolute title to the found property, but may keep it against all but the rightful owner |
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Brown v. Lober Supreme Court of Illinois, 1979 389 N.E.2d 1188 Pg. 1210 |
Owner sells 80 acres to defendant, but retains two-thirds interest in the minerals. When defendant resells and conveys deed to plaintiff, however, there is no mention of this reserved interest. Plaintiff then sells to a third party and the partial interest is discovered. | An owner's discovery that there exists a superior title to a portion of its land does NOT constitute a sufficient constructive eviction to breach a covenant of quiet enjoyment. NOTE: Such discovery is sufficient to claim action on a breach of covenant of seisin (watch out for statute of limitations). |
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Dolan v. City of Tigard Supreme Court of the United States, 1994 512 U.S. 374 Pg. 855 |
Florence Dolan owned a supply store and wanted to redevelop the site. The City of Tigard issued her a permit to expand, but it was subject to the condition that Dolan convey part of her property to the city to be used as a greenway and pedestrian pathway. The city justified their request because the pathway would help prevent some flooding that would occur from a nearby creek with the expansion, and it would also offset some traffic demands. Dolan sued, alleging the condition constituted an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. | The Supreme Court held that the condition constituted an impermissible taking under the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court reasoned that although a land use regulation does not constitute a taking if it substantially advances legitimate state interests and does not economically viable use of his land, a determination must be made as to whether a nexus exists between the legitimate state interest and the condition exacted. In addition, there must be a rough proportionality between the demands of the city and the impact of the proposed development. The city must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development. Here, even though a nexus existed, the condition was not roughly proportionate to the impact of Dolan’s redevelopment. |
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Gruen v. Gruen Court of Appeals of New York, 1986 496 N.E.2d 869 Pg. 217 |
Plaintiff claims that his father gave him a painting for the plaintiff's 21st birthday. Plaintiff never received the painting because the father stated in a letter that he wished to retain a life estate in the painting. Upon the father's death the plaintiff sought possession of the painting from his step-mother. The step-mother refused and the plaintiff brought suit. | To make a valid inter vivos gift the donor must intend to transfer title; the donor must either actually or constructively deliver the gift to the donee and the donee must accept the gift. These elements must be proved by the donee by clear and convincing evidence. |
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Hannah v. Peel King's Bench Division, 1945 K.B. 509 Pg. 129 |
Plaintiff, a lance-corporal in the Royal Artillery, was stationed at Gwernhaylod House. While adjusting the curtains in a bedroom, he discovered a brooch covered with cobwebs and dirt. The plaintiff informed his commanding officer of his find of the brooch and handed it to the police. Two years later, the police were still unable to find the owner of the brooch and gave the brooch to the defendant, the owner of the house. The defendant sold the brooch for 66 pounds. | While the owner of land may have some claim to items buried or embedded in the land, generally, the place in which a lost article is found does not constitute any exception to the general rule of law, that the finder is entitled to it as against all persons except the owner. |
|
Hickey v. Green Appeals Court of Massachusetts, 1982 445 N.E.2d 156 Pg. 932 |
Buyer (plaintiff) and seller (defendant) ORALLY agree to the sale of property, and buyer writes a check for down payment, which seller accepts. Buyer sells his current home in anticipation of the move. Seller informs buyer that she has decided to sell to someone else for more money. Buyer offers to match the higher price, but seller refuses. | A land sale contract that fails to comply with the Statute of Frauds may be specifically enforced if party acted in reasonable reliance and "has so changed his position that injustice can be avoided only by specific enforcement." This is known as the ESTOPPEL exception to the Statute of Frauds. NOTE: The other important exception is PART PERFORMANCE. |
|
Johnson v. M'Intosh Supreme Court of the United States, 1823 21 U.S. 543 Pg. 85 |
Two competing claims of right to the same land. One was bought from Indian Tribes, the other was purchased from the U.S. Government. | The Sovereign U.S. Government honors only titles bestowed upon citizens from the U.S. It does not honor land title bestowed upon citizens by Indian tribes. |
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Kelo v. City of New London Supreme Court of the United States, 2005 545 U.S. 469; 125 S. Ct. 2655 Pg. 792 |
City acquired resident's property by means of eminent domain in order to further the economic redevelopment of the area. Although the city subsequently transferred property to private interests, the city claimed that the economic benefits constituted public use. | The Court will not second guess the legislature regarding the need for a proposed taking, or the actual property that needs to be taken. Additionally, economic development constitutes a public use of property. |
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Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. Supreme Court of the United States, 1982 458 U.S. 419 Pg. 808 |
Defendant placed television cables and transmission boxes on Plaintiff's buildings pursuant to state statute. Plaintiff sued claiming that placement of the cables pursuant to statute constituted an unlawful taking under the Fifth Amendment. | Physical occupation of property is a per se taking under the Fifth Amendment. |
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Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council Supreme Court of the United States, 1992 505 U.S. 1003 Pg. 836 |
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McAvoy v. Medina Supreme Court of Massachusetts, 1866 93 Mass. 548 Pg. 131 |
Customer (plaintiff) in a barber shop sees a pocketbook on the counter and claims it as his own. Customer leaves pocketbook with barber (defendant) to advertise and give to true owner. Alas, the true owner never emerges from the shroud of anonymity and the customer asks for the pocketbook back. The barber refuses. | If property is INTENTIONALLY placed and FORGOTTEN, it is deemed "mislaid." In cases of mislaid property, both the true owner and owner of premises (locus in quo) have rights superior to that of finder. |
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Moore v. Regents of the University of California Supreme Court of California, 1990 793 P.2d 479 Pg. 27 |
Doctors operating on Moore's spleen removed some cancerous cells that later were capable of producing proteins that impacted the immune system. The cells ended up having a tremendous amount of commercial value. Moore claimed a conversion cause of action in that the doctors deprived him of his use of the cells. That claimed failed, but Moore won on a breach of fiduciary duty to disclose, because the doctors didn't tell him what they intended to do with his cells. | Labor and ingenuity, such as the manipulation of a cell line, can spawn property rights. |
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Neponsit Property Owners' Association, Inc. v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank Court of Appeals of New York, 1938 15 N.E.2d 793 Pg. 628 |
Plaintiff, a homeowners association, acquired a lien on Defendant's property for the failure to pay fees to the association. These fees were required by covenant which was included on the deed. Plaintiff foreclosed on the property to satisfy the lien. | A covenant will run with the land and will be enforceable against a subsequent purchaser of the land only if: (1) the grantor and grantee intended that the covenant should run with the land; (2) the covenant is one 'touching' or 'concerning' the land with which it runs; (3) there is 'privity of estate' between the promisee or party claiming the benefit of the covenant and the right to enforce it, and the promisor or party who rests under the burden of the covenant. Covenant to pay a fee sufficiently runs with the land. |
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Nollan v. California Costal Commission Supreme Court of the United States, 1987 483 U.S. 825 Pg. 849 |
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O'Keefe v. Snyder Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1980 416 A.2d 862 Pg. 156 |
Plaintiff is an artist who had paintings stolen from a New York art gallery in 1946. Years later she discovered the paintings and brought suit to recover the paintings. Current owner claims possession by adverse possession. When paintings were stolen they had little economic value and their theft was not reported to police. In 1976, plaintiff discovered the paintings. Defendant claims title through adverse possession. | To establish title by adverse possession to chattels, the rule of law has been that the possession must be hostile, actual, visible, exclusive, and continuous. In dealing with chattels open and visible possession may not be sufficient to put the rightful owner on notice. Accordingly, the doctrine of adverse of possession may not be the best rule in dealing with chattels and the discovery rule may be more appropriate. The discovery rule provides that a cause of action will not accrue until the injured party discovers, or should have discovered the facts that make up the basis of the cause of action. |
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Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Supreme Court of the United States, 2001 533 U.S. 606 Pg. 868 |
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Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New York Supreme Court of the United States, 1978 438 U.S. 104 Pg. 820 |
City of New York designated Penn Central Station an historic landmark. This designation prohibited the plaintiff from entering into a lucrative deal in constructing an office building. Plaintiff sued claiming this was an unlawful taking of its property. | A regulatory action will not be a taking if the restrictions imposed are substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare and not only permit reasonable beneficial use of the landmark site but also afford property owner's reasonable return on its investment. |
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Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon Supreme Court of the United States, 1922 260 U.S. 393 Pg. 811 |
Plaintiff Coal company sold land but reserved the rights to mine coal beneath the property. State statute passed prohibiting the mining of coal in certain circumstances. Plaintiff sued claiming this statute destroyed plaintiff's retained interest. | The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking. |
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Sanborn v. McLean Supreme Court of Michigan, 1925 206 N.W. 496 Pg. 642 |
Plaintiffs and Defendants reside in a residential community that has restrictions place upon a majority of the lots. Defendants attempted to build a gas station on their non-restricted lot. Plaintiffs sued attempting to block the construction of the gas station. | If the owner of two or more lots, so situated as to bear the relation, sells one with restrictions of benefit to the land retained, the servitude becomes mutual, and, during the period of restraint, the owner of the lot or lots retained can do nothing forbidden to the owner of the lot sold. |
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Spur Industries, Inc. v. Del E. Webb Development Co. Supreme Court of Arizona, 1972 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 Pg. 685 |
Complainant is a developer of neighbors and golf courses. He brings suit against Spur Industries to enjoin its cattle feeding operation, under a theory of public nuisance for both flies and odor. | "[B]efore an otherwise lawful (and necessary) business may be declared a public nuisance, there must be a 'populous' area in which people are injured. . . A business which is not per se a public nuisance may become such by being carried on at a place where the health, comfort, or convenience of a populous neighborhood is affected. . . . What might amount to a serious nuisance in one locality by reason of the density of the population, or character of the neighborhood affected, may in another place and under different surroundings be deemed proper and unobjectionable." |
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State v. Shack Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1971 277 A.2d 369 Pg. 36 |
Tedesco, a farmer, employed migrant farm workers. Tejeras, a field worker for a nonprofit corporation that helps migrant farmers and Shack, an attorney for a nonprofit that helps migrant farm workers, entered Tedesco's land to provide services to migrant farmers, who were housed on Tedesco's land. Tedesco approached them, he offered to locate a man, who was to have sutures removed, and offered to find the man that Shack wanted to legally advise so long as the legal consultation took place in his office. The men refused and insisted that they provide their services to the men in the privacy of the migrant workers' living quarters without Tedesco's supervision. Tedesco filed a complaint for trespass. | Individual and societal interests may sometimes trump property interests. "Property rights serve human values. They are recognized to that end, and are limited by it. Title to real property cannot include dominion over the destiny of persons the owner permits to come upon the premises. Their well-being must remain the paramount concern of a system of law. Indeed the needs of the occupants may be so imperative and their strength so weak, that the law will deny the occupants the power to contract away what is deemed essential to their health, welfare, or dignity." |
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Tulk v. Moxhay Court of Chancery, England, 1848 2 Phillips 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 Pg. 634 |
Plaintiff sold land with an agreement to keep the property in its similar form. The land then passed to the defendant whose deed did not contain the covenant. Plaintiff brought suit to enforce the restriction. | The court will enforce some covenants in equity that cannot be enforced by law. |
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Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas Supreme Court of the United States, 1974 416 U.S. 1 Pg. 890 |
Village of Belle Terre had an ordinance which limited use to single family homes. Appellant moved in with six classmates. The village attempted to enforce the ordinance and the appellants sued to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance. | The police power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for people. |
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Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty co. Supreme Court of the United States, 1926 272 U.S. 365 Pg. 753 |
Appellant purchased property for investment in industry. City passed zoning ordinance which significantly reduced the value of the property. The appellant sued claiming he was deprived of his property without due process. | Before an ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare. There is no evidence that zoning ordinances are unreasonable. |
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Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist Supreme Court of California, 1972 498 P.2d 987 Pg. 565 |
Seller sold property which was eventually purchased by Plaintiff with an "easement to run with the land only so long as the property for whose benefit the easement is given is used for church purposes." This easement entitled the defendant church to use the property for parking. Plaintiff filed suit seeking to quiet title in the property and remove the easement. | Common law rule prohibited a grantor from retaining an interest in a third party. This rule no longer applies in California. |
