Cases and Materials on Criminal Law
- Dressler
- 4th Edition
- ISBN: 0314177191
| Page | Case Name | Citation | Court | Audio |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 109 | City of Chicago v. Morales | 527 U.S. 41 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1999 |  Download |
| 48 | Regina v. Dudley and Stephens | 14 Q.B.D. 273 | Queen's Bench Division, 1884 | Download |
| 53 | People v. Du | No. BA037738 | Superior Court, Los Angeles County, 1991 | |
| 172 | United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie | 825 F.Supp. 485 | United States District Court, E.D. New York, 1993 | Download |
| 69 | Coker v. Georgia | 433 U.S. 584 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1977 | Download |
| 91 | Keeler v. Superior Court | 470 P.2d 617 | Supreme Court of California, 1970 | Download |
| 127 | Martin v. State | 31 Ala. App. 334, 17 So. 2d 427 | Alabama Court of Appeals, 1944 | Download |
| 140 | Barber v. Superior Court | 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 | California District Court of Appeal, 1983 | Download |
| 174 | Staples v. United States | 511 U.S. 600 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1994 | Download |
| 196 | People v. Marrero | 69 N.Y.2d 382, 507 N.E.2d 1068 | New York Court of Appeals, 1987 | Download |
| 206 | Cheek v. United States | 498 U.S. 192 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1991 | Download |
| 259 | Girouard v. State | 321 Md. 532, 583 A.2d 718 | Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1991 | Download |
| 281 | People v. Casassa | 49 N.Y.2d 668, 404 N.E.2d 1310 | New York Court of Appeals, 1980 | Download |
| 301 | State v. Williams | 4 Wash. App. 908, 484 P.2d 1167 | Washington Court of Appeals, 1971 | Download |
| 301 | People v. Smith | 35 Cal. 3d 798, 678 P.2d 886 | California Supreme Court, 1984 | Download |
| 342 | Gregg v. Georgia | 428 U.S. 153 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 | |
| 359 | McCleskey v. Kemp | 481 U.S. 279 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1987 | Download |
| 411 | State v. Rusk | 289 Md. 230, 424 A.2d 720 | Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1981 | Download |
| 432 | State in the Interest of M.T.S. | 129 N.J. 422, 609 A.2d 1266 | New Jersey Supreme Court, 1992 | Download |
| 451 | Commonwealth v. Sherry | 386 Mass. 682, 437 N.E. 2d 224 | Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1982 | Download |
| 480 | Patterson v. New York | 432 U.S. 197 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1977 | Download |
| 494 | United States v. Peterson | 483 F.2d 1222 | United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, 1973 | Download |
| 504 | People v. Goetz | 68 N.Y.2d 96, 497 N.E.2d 41 | New York Court of Appeals, 1986 | Download |
| 530 | State v. Norman | 324 N.C. 253, 378 S.E.2d 8 | Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1989 | Download |
| 547 | People v. Ceballos | 12 Cal. 3d 470, 526 P.2d 241 | Supreme Court of California, 1974 | Download |
| 553 | Tennessee v. Garner | 471 U.S. 1 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1985 | Download |
| 568 | United States v. Schoon | 971 F.2d 193 | United States Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit, 1992 | Download |
| 594 | People v. Unger | 66 Ill. 2d 333, 362 N.E.2d 319 | Supreme Court of Illinois, 1977 | Download |
| 648 | State v. Green | 643 S.W.2d 902 | Tennessee Court of Appeals, 1982 | Download |
| 934 | Topolewski v. State | 130 Wis. 244, 109 N.W. 1037 | Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1906 | Download |
| 708 | Robinson v. California | 370 U.S. 660 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1962 | Download |
| 713 | Powell v. Texas | 392 U.S. 514 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1968 | Download |
| 763 | People v. Rizzo | 246 N.Y. 334, 158 N.E. 888 | Court of Appeals of New York, 1927 | Download |
| 813 | Pinkerton v. United States | 328 U.S. 640 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1946 | Download |
| 50 | People v. Superior Court (Du) | 5 Cal.App.4th 822, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 177 | California Court of Appeals, Second District, 1992 | Download |
| 822 | People v. Lauria | 251 Cal. App. 2d 471, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628 | California District Court of Appeal, 1967 | Download |
| 855 | Gebardi v. United States | 287 U.S. 112 | Supreme Court of the United States, 1932 | |
| 134 | People v. Beardsley | 150 Mich. 206, 113 N.W. 1128 | Supreme Court of Michigan, 1907 | Download |
| 883 | Wilcox v. Jeffery | 1 All E.R. 464 | King's Bench Division, 1951 | Download |
| 161 | State v. Nations | 676 S.W.2d 282 | Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, 1984 | Download |
| 945 | People v. Brown | 105 Cal. 66, 38 P. 518 | Supreme Court of California, 1894 | Download |
| 129 | State v. Utter | 4 Wash.App. 137, 479 P.2d 946 | Court of Appeals of Washington, 1971 | Download |
| 151 | People v. Conley | 187 Ill.App.3d 234, 134 Ill.Dec. 855, 543 N.E.2d 138 | Illinois Appellate Court, 1989 | Download |
| 959 | People v. Whight | 36 Cal. App. 4th 1143 | California Court of Appeals | |
| 13 | Owens v. State | 93 Md.App. 162, 611 A.2d 1043 | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 1992 | Download |
| 149 | Regina v. Cunningham | 2 Q.B. 396 | Court of Criminal Appeal, 1957 | Download |
| 248 | State v. Guthrie | 194 W.Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 | Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, 1995 | Download |
| 116 | United States v. Foster | 133 F.3d 704 | United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 1998 | Download |
| 101 | In re Banks | 295 N.C. 236, 244 S.E.2d 386 | Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1976 | Download |
| 88 | Commonwealth v. Mochan | 177 Pa.Super. 454, 110 A.2d 788 | Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1955 | Download |
| 59 | United States v. Gementera | 379 F.3d 596 | United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 2004 | Download |
| 167 | United States v. Morris | 928 F.2d 504 | United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1991 | Download |
| 217 | Kibbe v. Henderson | 534 F.2d 493 | United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1976 | Download |
| 184 | Garnett v. State | 332 Md. 571, 632 A.2d 797 | Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1993 | Download |
| 191 | People v. Navarro | 99 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 160 Cal.Rptr. 692 | Appellate Department, Los Angeles County Superior Court, 1979 | Download |
| 211 | Velazquez v. State | 561 So.2d 347 | District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1990 | Download |
| 212 | Oxendine v. State | 528 A.2d 870 | Supreme Court of Delaware, 1987 | Download |
| 271 | Attorney General for Jersey v. Holley | UKPC 23, 3 All ER 371 | Privy Council, 2005 | |
| 255 | State v. Forrest | 321 N.C. 186, 362 S.E.2d 252 | Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1987 | Download |
| 227 | State v. Rose | 112 R.I. 402, 311 A.2d 281 | Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1973 | Download |
| 242 | People v. Eulo | 63 N.Y.2d 341, 482 N.Y.S.2d 436, 472 N.E.2d 286 | Court of Appeals of New York, 1984 | Download |
| 253 | Midgett v. State | 292 Ark. 278, 729 S.W.2d 410 | Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1987 | Download |
| 292 | Berry v. Superior Court | 208 Cal.App.3d 783, 256 Cal.Rptr. 344 | California Court of Appeals, Sixth District, 1989 | Download |
| 294 | People v. Nieto Benitez | 4 Cal.4th 91, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 864, 840 P.2d 969 | Supreme Court of California, 1992 | Download |
| 297 | State v. Hernandez | 815 S.W.2d 67 | Missouri Court of Appeals, 1991 | Download |
| 311 | People v. Fuller | 86 Cal.App.3d 618, 150 Cal.Rptr. 515 | California Court of Appeals, Fifth District, 1978 | Download |
| 321 | People v. Howard | 34 Cal.4th 1129, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 306, 104 P.3d 107 | Supreme Court of California, 2005 | Download |
| 328 | People v. Robertson | 34 Cal.4th 156, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 604, 95 P.3d 872 | Supreme Court of California, 2004 | Download |
| Case Information | Fact Summary | Rule of Law |
|---|---|---|
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City of Chicago v. Morales Supreme Court of the United States, 1999 527 U.S. 41 Pg. 109 |
In 1992, the City of Chicago enacted the Gang Congregation Ordinance, which prohibits people from loitering with one another in any public place. The question is whether the ordinance violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. | The Court held that the the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague. It did not provide sufficiently specific limits on the enforcement discretion of the police, nor did it provide sufficient notice to citizens who wish to use the public streets. |
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Regina v. Dudley and Stephens Queen's Bench Division, 1884 14 Q.B.D. 273 Pg. 48 |
Several men went sailing and were caught in a storm and pushed out to sea. After days without food, two of the men decided to eat the cabin boy. | Extreme hunger does not justify murder and is therefore punishable. |
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People v. Du Superior Court, Los Angeles County, 1991 No. BA037738 Pg. 53 |
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United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie United States District Court, E.D. New York, 1993 825 F.Supp. 485 Pg. 172 |
Two defendants transported heroin into the United States believing it to be cocaine. The court is asked to evaluate their mistake of fact and determine whether they should be punished only for the crimes they believed they were committing. | "[T]he mens rea principle remains, in the modern criminal law, a fundamental requirement. . . . Like most ancient doctrines, however, it has grown far more sophisticated and nuanced than it once was. It can no longer simply be invoked. Its application must be carefully explained and its many distinctions must be considered." |
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Coker v. Georgia Supreme Court of the United States, 1977 433 U.S. 584 Pg. 69 |
Petitioner escaped from prison and broke into the home of a husband and wife. He then robbed the husband and raped the wife while brandishing a knife. Petitioner was apprehended and sentenced to death by a jury under Georgia law. | The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution prohibits the death penalty for the crime of rape of an adult woman. Regardless of the aggravated circumstances surrounding the rape, capital punishment is disproportionate. |
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Keeler v. Superior Court Supreme Court of California, 1970 470 P.2d 617 Pg. 91 |
Petitioner put his knee into the stomach of Mrs. Keeler, who was pregnant at the time, in an effort to stomp the fetus out of her. The trauma crushed the skull of the fetus causing it to be delivered stillborn. The issue put before the court was whether petitioner could be tried for murder. | The court issued a peremptory writ of prohibition restraining the trial court from proceeding with prosecution for murder because an unborn fetus was not a human being within the meaning of California's murder statute. |
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Martin v. State Alabama Court of Appeals, 1944 31 Ala. App. 334, 17 So. 2d 427 Pg. 127 |
Police officers arrested Martin at his home, where he was drunk, and then took him to a highway and then arrested him for being drunk on the highway. | To satisfy the actus reus element of a crime, the defendant must act voluntarily. In other words, the brain must command the defendant's actions. |
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Barber v. Superior Court California District Court of Appeal, 1983 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 Pg. 140 |
A man underwent surgery, during which he suffered from cardio-respiratory arrest. He was revived, but was left in a vegetative state. The family decided to take the patient off life support. | A doctor has no legal duty to continue life support, once it has become futile. However, the doctor must obtain consent to stop life support and must present an objective calculation of the patient's chance of living. |
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Staples v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1994 511 U.S. 600 Pg. 174 |
Defendant failed to register his firearm. The defendant didn't know that his firearm had been altered, making it a semi-automatic weapon and rendering it subject to the statute under which he was prosecuted. | Although a statute doesn't mention a mens rea requirement, the Court will impute mens rea to the offense. |
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People v. Marrero New York Court of Appeals, 1987 69 N.Y.2d 382, 507 N.E.2d 1068 Pg. 196 |
Federal corrections officer was arrested at a club for carrying an unregistered weapon; he thought he was included in the exceptions for peace officers in the statute. | In general, a mistaken belief as to the meaning of a criminal statute (even a good faith or reasonable one) is NOT a defense to a violation of the statute. "Ignorance of the law is no excuse." |
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Cheek v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1991 498 U.S. 192 Pg. 206 |
An American Airlines pilot was convicted for failing to pay income taxes. He alleged that his failure to pay taxes was not "wilfull" as required by the statute. | A mistake may be a valid defense if it negates the mens rea element of a crime. |
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Girouard v. State Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1991 321 Md. 532, 583 A.2d 718 Pg. 259 |
Defendant stabs wife 19 times after repeated verbal provocation by his wife, including telling him that she wanted a divorce, never loved him, and had filed charges against him for abuse. | Verbal provocation alone is not enough to mitigate a charge of murder to manslaughter. |
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People v. Casassa New York Court of Appeals, 1980 49 N.Y.2d 668, 404 N.E.2d 1310 Pg. 281 |
Defendant kills a woman he was dating after she breaks up with him, and was charged with second-degree murder. The killing was preceded by a number of bizare actions on the part of the defendant. At trial, defendant argued that he was under the influence of an "extreme emotional disturbance" at the time of the killings, in order to reduce the conviction to manslaughter. | The affirmative defense of "extreme emotional disturbance" is judged by both a subjective and objective standard. Whether the defendant did in fact act under an "extreme emotional disturbance is determined by a subjective standard. Whether there was a "reasonable explination or excuse" for the defendant's disturbance is determined by an objective standard. |
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State v. Williams Washington Court of Appeals, 1971 4 Wash. App. 908, 484 P.2d 1167 Pg. 301 |
Child of defendant parents died when an abcessed tooth became gangrenous, preventing the child from eating and eventually leading to pneumonia. They did not take him to a doctor because they thought he simply had a toothache, and because they were afraid that the child would be taken away from them due to the appearance of neglect. | When the statutory standard of negligence is "ordinary or simple," parents are negligent when they fail to "measure up to the conduct required for a man of reasonable prudence ... If such negligence proximately causes the death of the victim, the defendant ... is guilty of statutory manslaughter." |
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People v. Smith California Supreme Court, 1984 35 Cal. 3d 798, 678 P.2d 886 Pg. 301 |
Defendant and the man she was living with beat her two-year-old daughter until she went into respiratory arrest. Defendant was convicted of felony murder, with the underlying felony of child abuse. | The felony-murder rule cannot apply "where the purpose of the conduct was the very assault which resulted in death," including situations where the underlying felony is child abuse. |
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Gregg v. Georgia Supreme Court of the United States, 1976 428 U.S. 153 Pg. 342 |
Defendant, a hitchhiker, killed and robbed two men who had picked him up. After being convicted and sentenced to death under Georgia's newly revised capital punishment statute, defendant challenges the imposition of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment. | "...The death penalty is not a form of punishment that may never be imposed, regardless of the circumstances of the offense, regardless of the character of the offender, and regardless of the procedure followed in reaching the decision to impose it. ... The concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance. As a general proposition these concerns are best met by a system that provides for a bifurcated proceeding at which the sentencing authority is apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of sentence and provided with standards to guide its use of the information..." |
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McCleskey v. Kemp Supreme Court of the United States, 1987 481 U.S. 279 Pg. 359 |
Defendant, a black man, was convicted of two counts of robbery and one count of murder. He was sentenced to death. On appeal, defendant presented a complex statistical study that indicated a risk that racial considerations enter into capital sentencing determinations. Defendant, claimed that this was a violation of his Fourteenth and Eighth Amendment rights. | The court held that the study did not demonstrate a constitutionally significant risk of racial bias as to violate the defendant's constitutional rights. |
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State v. Rusk Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1981 289 Md. 230, 424 A.2d 720 Pg. 411 |
Plaintiff takes defendant home in plaintiff's car. Defendant takes plaintiff up to his room and has sexual intercourse with plaintiff. Plaintiff claims that she was raped. The question is whether there was sufficient evidence shown to support the conviction. | The court concluded that the jury could have rationally found that the essential elements of second degree rape had been established. |
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State in the Interest of M.T.S. New Jersey Supreme Court, 1992 129 N.J. 422, 609 A.2d 1266 Pg. 432 |
Defendant, a 17 year-old male, had sex with the 15 year-old plaintiff in the plaintiff's bedroom late one night. Plaintiff claimed it was rape. Defendant claimed it was consensual. | Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding that the girl had not expressed consent, either through her words or actions, to the act of intercourse. |
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Commonwealth v. Sherry Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 1982 386 Mass. 682, 437 N.E. 2d 224 Pg. 451 |
Three doctors became acquainted wih a nurse at a party. The three doctors took the nurse away from the party and had sexual intercourse with her, each in turn. The doctors claim that it was consensual. The nurse claims that she was gang raped. After being convicted the doctors sought to have the case dismissed. | The court found no error in the record nor any cause to reverse the judgment. Thus, the conviction was sustained. |
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Patterson v. New York Supreme Court of the United States, 1977 432 U.S. 197 Pg. 480 |
Patterson and his wife seperated. His wife resumed a relationship with a neighbor, John Northrup. Patterson found them together and killed Northrup. | All elements of the offense must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not necessary that affirmative defenses be disproved. |
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United States v. Peterson United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, 1973 483 F.2d 1222 Pg. 494 |
Defendant was indicted of second-degree murder and convicted of manslaughter. Defendant now urges that the judge erred in the instructions given the jury in relation to his claim that the homicide was committed in self-defense. | The court sustained the trial judge's action in remitting the issue of self-defense to the jury for determination and found no error in the trial judge's instruction. |
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People v. Goetz New York Court of Appeals, 1986 68 N.Y.2d 96, 497 N.E.2d 41 Pg. 504 |
Defendant was approached by 4 youths on a subway car. The youths demanded money from defendant. Fearing that he was about to be robbed, defendant decided to shoot each youth with an unregistered handgun he had with him to fend off muggers. A grand jury indicted defendant on 4 charges of attempted murder. Defendant challenged the prosecutors charge to the grand jury on the defense of justification. | In New York, whether a defendant is justified in killing another is determined by an objective, or "reasonable man", standard, not a subjective standard; whether the actions of the defendant were reasonable is "based on the circumstances facing a defendant or his situation..." |
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State v. Norman Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1989 324 N.C. 253, 378 S.E.2d 8 Pg. 530 |
A wife killed her husband by shooting him three times in the back of the head while he was sleeping. The husband had beaten and degraded the wife for more than twenty years. The question is whether the wife can assert she acted out of self-defense due to battered woman's syndrome. | The court held that the wife could not assert self-defense because she lacked the belief that she was under a threat of imminent death or great bodily harm. |
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People v. Ceballos Supreme Court of California, 1974 12 Cal. 3d 470, 526 P.2d 241 Pg. 547 |
Defendant set up a spring gun to protect his garage from intruders after some of his property had been stolen. Two teenagers subsequently tried to break into his garage, whereupon one was shot in the face. | "Where the character and manner of [a] burglary [does] not reasonably create a fear of great bodily harm [or death], there is no cause for exaction of human life." Where no one but the alleged burglar is on the premises, there is no fear of great bodily harm or death. |
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Tennessee v. Garner Supreme Court of the United States, 1985 471 U.S. 1 Pg. 553 |
A policeman shot and killed a suspect that was fleeing from the scene of a buglary after ordering him to halt. The suspect was a minor, had a slight build, and was not armed. The policeman shot the suspect solely to prevent him from escaping. | A police officer may not use deadly force against a fleeing felony suspect unless he has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm to the officer or others. |
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United States v. Schoon United States Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit, 1992 971 F.2d 193 Pg. 568 |
Defendants appeal their conviction for obstructing the activities of the IRS office in Tucson, Arizona and failing to comply with the order of a federal officer. The convictions stemmed from a protest staged by the defendants in order to bring attention to United States involvment in El Salvador. | The court held that the necessity defense was not intended as justification for illegal acts taken in indirect political protest. |
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People v. Unger Supreme Court of Illinois, 1977 66 Ill. 2d 333, 362 N.E.2d 319 Pg. 594 |
Defendant was convicted of escape after he walked off of an "honor farm" while serving a sentence for auto theft. Defendant claimed that he escaped because other inmates threatened to rape and kill him. Defendant wanted to assert the defenses of necessity and compulsion at trial, but was denied instructions on these defenses. | Necessity can be an affirmative defense to the crime of escape. Relevant factors to be used in assessing claims of necessity are: "(1) The prisoner is faced with a specific threat of death, forcible sexual attack or substantial bodily injury in the immediate future; (2) There is no time for a complaint to the authorities or there exists a history of futile complaints which make any result from such complaints illusory; (3) There is no time or opportunity to resort to the courts; (4) There is no evidence of force or violence used towards prison personnel or other 'innocent' persons in the escape; and (5) The prisoner immediately reports to the proper authorities when he has attained a position of safety from the immediate threat." The defense of necessity is not, however, expressly conditioned on the above factors. |
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State v. Green Tennessee Court of Appeals, 1982 643 S.W.2d 902 Pg. 648 |
Defendant was convicted of killing a police officer. Defendant had a long history of mental illness and pleaded the insanity defense. | The court held that the State had failed to meet its burden of establishing sanity, and thus the evidence was insufficient to support the conviction. |
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Topolewski v. State Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 1906 130 Wis. 244, 109 N.W. 1037 Pg. 934 |
The accused arranged to have an employee of the Plankinton Packing Company place three barrels of the company's meat on the loading platform, the plan being that the accused would load the barrels on his wagon and drive away as if he were a customer. The employee notified the company of the plan. Accused then took the barrels as planned and was arrested. | Where the owner of the property by himself or through his agent, actually or constructively, aids in the commission of the offense the would-be criminal cannot be found guilty on all the elements of the offense. |
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Robinson v. California Supreme Court of the United States, 1962 370 U.S. 660 Pg. 708 |
Defendant was convicted of being addicted to narcotics after two police officers witnessed scar tissue and needle marks on his forearm. | The court held that the California statute making addiction to narcotics a crime violated the Constitution because it was a cruel and unusual punishment. |
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Powell v. Texas Supreme Court of the United States, 1968 392 U.S. 514 Pg. 713 |
Defendant was convicted under a Texas Statute prohibiting public drunkeness. Defendant claimed that he could not help being drunk due to his alcoholism, and that to punish him for being an addict was a violation of his constitutional rights. | Court held that it was not a violation of defendant's constitutional rights because he wasn't being punished for being drunk, but for being drunk in a public place. |
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People v. Rizzo Court of Appeals of New York, 1927 246 N.Y. 334, 158 N.E. 888 Pg. 763 |
Defendant was arrested, along with three accomplices, for attempted robbery. At the time of their arrest, they were driving around looking for a particular person who carried a $1,200 payroll, but had not yet found the person. | When determining whether the overt acts of a defendant rise to the level of a criminal attempt, "The law ... considers those acts only as tending to the commission of the crime which are so near to its accomplishment that in all reasonable probability the crime itself would have been committed but for timely interference." |
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Pinkerton v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1946 328 U.S. 640 Pg. 813 |
Two brothers were indicted for violations of the Internal Revenue Code. There was no evidence to support the conviction of one of the brothers on the substantive offense. | An overt act of one partner may be the act of all without any new agreement specifically directed to that act. Motive or intent may be proved by the acts or declarations of some of the conspirators in furtherance of the common objective. |
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People v. Superior Court (Du) California Court of Appeals, Second District, 1992 5 Cal.App.4th 822, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 177 Pg. 50 |
The defendant ran a liquor store with her husband. Victim was a 15-year-old who the defendant believed was stealing a bottle of orange juice. A struggle ensued when the defendant attempted to retrieve the juice. A the victim turned to leave the store, after putting the juice on the counter, defendant shot her in the back of the head at a distance of approximately three feet. The jury found the defendant guilty of manslaughter. | A just punishment should: 1) protect society, 2) punish the defendant for wrongdoing, 3) encourage the defendant to be good in the future, 4) deter other crimes, 5) incapacitate the defendant, 6) make restitution for the victim, and 7) be comparable to punishments for similar crimes. |
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People v. Lauria California District Court of Appeal, 1967 251 Cal. App. 2d 471, 59 Cal. Rptr. 628 Pg. 822 |
Defendant was indicted on conspiracy to commit prostitution. Defendant ran a phone answering service. He admitted that he knew some prostitutes used his service to set up appointments for their services. | "With respect to misdemeanors, we conclude that positive knowledge of the supplier that his products or services are being used for criminal purposes does not, without more, establish an intent of the supplier to participate in the misdemeanors..." With respect to felonies, "...the intent of a supplier who knows of the criminal use to which his supplies are put to participate in the criminal activity connected with the use of his supplies may be established by (1) direct evidence that he intends to participate, or (2) through an inference that he intends to participate based on, (a) his special interest in the activity, or (b) the aggravated nature of the crime itself." |
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Gebardi v. United States Supreme Court of the United States, 1932 287 U.S. 112 Pg. 855 |
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People v. Beardsley Supreme Court of Michigan, 1907 150 Mich. 206, 113 N.W. 1128 Pg. 134 |
Defendant drank liquor with victim for several days at his residence. While he was away at work, victim remained at the home and took several morphine pills and died as a result. Defendant was charged and found guilty of manslaughter for failure to take care of victim. | Courts will not impose liability for a mere moral obligation, rather a court will require that defendant had a legal duty to the victim, knowing her to be in peril of her life, which required him to make all reasonable and proper effort to save her. The omission to perform said duty would makes him responsible for her death. |
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Wilcox v. Jeffery King's Bench Division, 1951 1 All E.R. 464 Pg. 883 |
Defendant was convicted of unlawfully aiding jazz musician in obtaining employment in the United Kingdom, because he went to the concert and paid for a ticket. | When someone acts to encourage another in the commission of an illegal act, they satisfy the actus reus of accomplice liability. |
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State v. Nations Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, 1984 676 S.W.2d 282 Pg. 161 |
"Defendant, Sandra Nations, owns and operates the Main Street Disco, in which police officers found a scantily clad sixteen year old girl dancing for tips." She was charged with endangering the welfare of a child "less than seventeen years old," and she argues that the state failed to make a submissible case because it failed to show she knew the child was under seventeen. | A defendant's consciousness of "a substantial and unjustifiable risk" that a child is under seventeen is not knowledge under the criminal code. Even if a defendant's disregard of the risk was a "gross deviation" from the norm, this "is 'recklessness', nothing more." |
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People v. Brown Supreme Court of California, 1894 105 Cal. 66, 38 P. 518 Pg. 945 |
Appellant entered an acquaintance's house and took a bicycle. Appellant claimed that he didn't intend to keep the bicycle, he just wanted to get even with the owner. Appellant was convicted and appeals on account of error in an instruction given to the jury. | The court held that the jury instruction contained error because it implied that the boy could be convicted even if his intent was to deprive the owner only temporarily of the bicycle. The court held, however, that in order for the conviction to be sustained intent must be to deprive the owner of the property permanently. |
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State v. Utter Court of Appeals of Washington, 1971 4 Wash.App. 137, 479 P.2d 946 Pg. 129 |
Appellant, Claude Gilbert Utter was convicted by a jury of the crime of manslaughter after stabbing his son to death. Utter contends that his actions were a "conditioned response" and that as as a result of his jungle warfare training and experiences in World War II, he was prone to react violently towards people approaching him unexpectedly from the rear. He therefore argues that his violent act towards his son was no voluntary. | "An "act" committed while one is unconscious is in reality no act at all. It is merely a physical event or occurrence for which there can be no criminal liability. However, unconsciousness does not, in all cases, provide a defense to a crime. When the state of unconsciousness is voluntarily induced through the use and consumption of alcohol or drugs, then that state of unconsciousness does not attain the stature of a complete defense. . . ." The issue of whether a defendant is in "an unconscious or automatistic state at the time he allegedly committed the criminal acts charged is a question of fact." |
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People v. Conley Illinois Appellate Court, 1989 187 Ill.App.3d 234, 134 Ill.Dec. 855, 543 N.E.2d 138 Pg. 151 |
The defendant, William J. Conley, was charged with two counts of aggravated battery based on permanent disability and great bodily harm, after he was found to have hit victim in the mouth with a wine bottle, causing jaw and tooth injury and permanent lip numbness. Among other contentions, Conley "asserts that while it may be inferred from his conduct that he intended to cause harm, it does not follow that he intended to cause permanent disability." | While "the State must establish the specific intent to bring about great bodily harm, or permanent disability or disfigurement . . . problems of proof are alleviated to the extent that the ordinary presumption that one intends the natural and probable consequences of his actions shifts the burden of production, though not persuasion, to the defendant." |
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People v. Whight California Court of Appeals 36 Cal. App. 4th 1143 Pg. 959 |
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Owens v. State Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 1992 93 Md.App. 162, 611 A.2d 1043 Pg. 13 |
A man was found intoxicated behind the wheel of a car parked in a private driveway. The man was convicted of driving while intoxicated through circumstantial evidence. | "[A] conviction on circumstantial evidence alone is not to be sustained unless the circumstances are inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence." |
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Regina v. Cunningham Court of Criminal Appeal, 1957 2 Q.B. 396 Pg. 149 |
The appellant stole money behind a gas meter, which released noxious gas, endagering the life of his prospective mother-in-law. | "In any statutory definition of a crime, malice must be taken not in the old vague sense of wickedness in general but as requiring either (1) An actual intention to do the particular kind of harm that in fact was done; or (2) recklessness as to whether such harm should occur or not. . . ." |
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State v. Guthrie Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, 1995 194 W.Va. 657, 461 S.E.2d 163 Pg. 248 |
Defendant suffered from severe psychiatric problems. Among his psychological maladies was an obsession with his nose. The victim was his co-worker. The two worked as dishwashers. The victim was teasing and joking with the defendant and snapped a towel at him several times. The victim finally snapped a towel, which flipped the defendant on the nose. The defendant took a knife from his pocket and stabbed the victim in the neck. | There must be some length of time that lapses between the intent to kill and the actual murder. |
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United States v. Foster United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 1998 133 F.3d 704 Pg. 116 |
Defendant and an accomplice manufactured methamphetamine, and were pulled over and arrested by police after an investigation. Police discovered a loaded semiautomatic gun in a zipped-up bag under the closed tarp of defendant's truck bed. In addition to possession of methamphetamine, Foster was also convicted "of carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime." The court here determines the meaning of the word "carry." | "[I]n order for a defendant to be convicted of 'carrying' a gun in violation of section 924(c)(1), the defendant must have transported the firearm on or about his or her person. . . . This means the firearm must have been immediately available for use by the defendant." |
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In re Banks Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1976 295 N.C. 236, 244 S.E.2d 386 Pg. 101 |
Defendant, convicted under a Peeping Tom statute, argues the statute is unconstitutional for two reasons. First, he claims that it is unconstitutionally vague, "because "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." And second, that it is overly broad because it prohibits innocent conduct. | "This requirement of definiteness has in this century been declared an essential element of due process of law. . . . [I]t is a well settled rule of statutory construction that, where a literal interpretation of the language of a statute would contravene the manifest purpose of the statute, the reason and purpose of the law will be given effect and the strict letter thereof disregarded. . . . Where possible the language of a statute will be interpreted so as to avoid an absurd consequence. . . ." . . ." |
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Commonwealth v. Mochan Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1955 177 Pa.Super. 454, 110 A.2d 788 Pg. 88 |
Defendant made repeated phone calls to the home of the victim and her family and during those calls made lewd statements about victim and her reputation as a woman of ill repute. Defendant now appeals on the grounds "that the conduct charged in the indictments, concededly not a criminal offense in this State by any statute, does not constitute a misdemeanor at common law." | "The test is not whether precedents can be found in the books but whether the alleged crimes could have been prosecuted and the offenders punished under the common law." |
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United States v. Gementera United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 2004 379 F.3d 596 Pg. 59 |
Defendant stole letters from several mailboxes and pled guilty to mail theft. Among other things, a District Court judge required defendant to perform 100 hours of community service consisting on standing in front of a post office with a sandwich board reading "I stole mail. This is my punishment." Defendant filed a motion to remove the sandwich board condition. | Probation and supervised release conditions must meet a "reasonable relation" test to statutory objectives. Further, "a public apology may serve a rehabilitative purpose." |
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United States v. Morris United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1991 928 F.2d 504 Pg. 167 |
Defendant, Morris, created and released a "worm" virus onto the Internet. He argues that "the Government had to prove not only that he intended the unauthorized access of a federal interest computer, but also that he intended to prevent others from using it, and thus cause a loss." | Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, the government need only prove that a defendant intended to access a federal interest computer, and not that a defendant intended to prevent authorized use of the computer's information and cause a loss. |
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Kibbe v. Henderson United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 1976 534 F.2d 493 Pg. 217 |
Defendant and his friend robbed victim and after taking him to bars to drink. Defendant then left him on the side of the road without his eye glasses. Victim was then hit by a passing car. Defendant was charged and convicted of robbery and murder in the second degree. He appeals arguing that the court erred in not defining causation to the jury. | ". . .[W]here death is produced by an intervening force, . . . the liability of one who put an antecedent force into action will depend on the difficult determination of whether the intervening force was a sufficiently independent or supervening cause of death. . . . [T]he controlling questions are whether the ultimate result was foreseeable to the original actor and whether the victim failed to do something easily within his grasp that would have extricated him from danger." |
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Garnett v. State Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1993 332 Md. 571, 632 A.2d 797 Pg. 184 |
Defendant, a mentally retarded male, was convicted of statutory rape when he engaged in sexual intercourse with a female, younger than 14. He argues the state erred in excluding evidence that he was told and believed that she was in fact a 16-year-old, and claims the state must prove that he knew she was younger than 14. | "It is well settled that in interpreting a statute to ascertain and effectuate its goal, our first recourse is to the words of the statute, giving them their ordinary and natural import. . . . While penal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the defendant, the construction must ultimately depend upon discerning the intention of the Legislature when it drafted and enacted the law in question. . . . To that end, the Court may appropriately look at the larger context, including external manifestations of the legislative purpose, within which statutory language appears. . ." |
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People v. Navarro Appellate Department, Los Angeles County Superior Court, 1979 99 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 160 Cal.Rptr. 692 Pg. 191 |
Defendant was charged with stealing four wooden beams from a construction site and appeals contending that the jury was improperly instructed because he believed the beams had been abandoned. | If a jury finds that a defendant had a good faith belief that he was entitled to take property, even if the belief is unreasonable by the objective standard of the reasonable person, the defendant should be acquitted because the requisite specific intent is not present. |
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Velazquez v. State District Court of Appeal of Florida, 1990 561 So.2d 347 Pg. 211 |
Defendant was engaged in a drag race when a co-competitor was killed in an accident. Defendant was charged and sentenced for vehicular homicide, and he appeals the court's decision imposing liability for the sole purpose of defendant's participation in the race. | Where a victim is killed by his own voluntary recklessness, a defendant will not be liable for the death for merely participating in the same conduct. The requirement of proximate cause is not present. |
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Oxendine v. State Supreme Court of Delaware, 1987 528 A.2d 870 Pg. 212 |
Defendant was convicted of manslaughter after he hit his six-year-old son in the stomach. The previous day defendant's girlfriend had struck defendant's son and caused tears in his intestines. Defendant appeals arguing that the medical testimony was insufficient to find that he is guilty. | "A finding of medical causation may not be based on speculation or conjecture. . . . A doctor's testimony that a certain thing is possible is no evidence at all. . . . His opinion as to what is possible is no more valid than the jury's own speculation as to what is or is not possible. Almost anything is possible, and it is improper to allow a jury to consider and base a verdict upon a "possible" cause of death." |
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Attorney General for Jersey v. Holley Privy Council, 2005 UKPC 23, 3 All ER 371 Pg. 271 |
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State v. Forrest Supreme Court of North Carolina, 1987 321 N.C. 186, 362 S.E.2d 252 Pg. 255 |
Defendant shot and killed his father while his father was suffering in a hospital bed, close to death from numerous serious ailments. Defendant was found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced to life in prison. He appeals the conviction, arguing that the court erred in its jury instructions. | "The 'heat of passion' doctrine is meant to reduce murder to manslaughter when defendant kills without premeditation and deliberation and without malice, but rather under the influence of the heat of passion suddenly aroused which renders the mind temporarily incapable of cool reflection." |
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State v. Rose Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 1973 112 R.I. 402, 311 A.2d 281 Pg. 227 |
Defendant struck victim with his car, and then drove away with the victim trapped beneath the tires. Defendant parked the car some 600 feet away from the scene of the accident and fled. Defendant was charged with two indictments, leaving the scene of an accident and manslaughter. He has brought a bill of exceptions to the court. | "A conclusion of guilt requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and proof to that extent is proof which precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that which it tends to support, and is consistent with the defendant's guilt and inconsistent with any other rational conclusion." |
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People v. Eulo Court of Appeals of New York, 1984 63 N.Y.2d 341, 482 N.Y.S.2d 436, 472 N.E.2d 286 Pg. 242 |
This case combines the trials of two defendants with similar issues. Both shot their victims and left them in a brain dead state. Afterward, their next of kin consented to having their organs donated and then removed life support. The defendants claim that due to "the absence of clear instruction, the juries may have erroneously concluded that defendants would be guilty of homicide if their conduct was the legal cause of the victims' "brain death" rather than the victims' ultimate state of cardiorespiratory failure." | ". . .[W]hen a determination has been made according to accepted medical standards that a person has suffered an irreversible cessation of heartbeat and respiration, or, when these functions are maintained solely by extraordinary mechanical means, an irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire brain, including the brain stem, no life traditionally recognized by the law is present in that body." |
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Midgett v. State Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1987 292 Ark. 278, 729 S.W.2d 410 Pg. 253 |
Appellant beat his eight-year-old son to death. He appeals from the state's finding of first degree murder claiming there was no premeditation. | "[T]here remains a difference between first and second degree murder, not only under our statute, but generally. . . . [O]ur duty is to give those accused of first degree murder the benefit of the requirement that they be shown by substantial evidence to have premeditated and deliberated the killing, no matter how heinous the facts may otherwise be." |
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Berry v. Superior Court California Court of Appeals, Sixth District, 1989 208 Cal.App.3d 783, 256 Cal.Rptr. 344 Pg. 292 |
Defendant owned a vicious pit bull named Willy that attacked and killed a two and a half year old neighbor boy. Defendant was charged with second degree murder and argues that he did not have the requisite malice for the charge. | There are "two required elements of implied malice, namely existence of an objective risk and subjective awareness of that risk." "In jurisdictions where liability for a dog bite cannot be imposed on the owner unless he knew of the dog's viciousness, the fact that the dog has previously attacked a person is strong evidence of his viciousness but is not necessarily the only kind of evidence which may be used to show scienter. . ." |
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People v. Nieto Benitez Supreme Court of California, 1992 4 Cal.4th 91, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 864, 840 P.2d 969 Pg. 294 |
Defendant and victim engaged in a verbal disagreement after victim spilled food on defendant's shirt. Defendant went home, got a gun and shot victim after victim lunged forward to punch or grab defendant. During the jury trial, the jury asked the meaning of an "intentional act" and the court agreed with the prosecution that it was the "pulling of a handgun in the manner described." Defendant was then convicted and sentenced to 17 years to life. Defendant appealed and the Court of Appeals overturned the conviction. The People now appeal to the Supreme Court of California. | "[A] murder committed with implied malice requires that the prosecution demonstrate the defendant in fact acted with malice. . . . The concept of implied malice has both a physical and a mental component. . . . The physical component is satisfied by the performance of 'an act, the natural consequences of which are dangerous to life.' . . . The mental component, as set forth earlier, involves an act 'deliberately performed by a person who knows that his conduct endangers the life of another and who acts with conscious disregard for life.' . . . Whether a defendant's underlying acts are inherently dangerous in the abstract is not dispositive in the jury's determination as to whether a defendant acted with malice." |
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State v. Hernandez Missouri Court of Appeals, 1991 815 S.W.2d 67 Pg. 297 |
Defendant hit and killed victim and injured several others, when his van collided with their vehicle. He "contends that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence . . . signs, stickers, and pins with the statements containing 'drinking slogans,'. . . [saying that they were] admitted in evidence . . . to try to show him to be the 'type' person who would commit the crime in question." | "Evidence is irrelevant if it does not logically tend to prove or disprove a fact in issue or to corroborate evidence which itself is relevant and bears on the principal issue. . . Reputation or character testimony is admissible only when a defendant has put his own reputation in issue." |
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People v. Fuller California Court of Appeals, Fifth District, 1978 86 Cal.App.3d 618, 150 Cal.Rptr. 515 Pg. 311 |
Defendant appeals a conviction of felony-murder after he unintentionally caused a death during a high speed automobile chase following the commission of a nonviolent, daylight burglary of an unattended motor vehicle. | The Supreme Court has stated that the meaning of murder committed in the perpetration of a felony within " does not require a strict causal relation between the felony and the killing; it is sufficient if both are 'parts of one continuous transaction.' . . . Whether the defendant has reached such a place of safety is a question of fact for the jury." |
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People v. Howard Supreme Court of California, 2005 34 Cal.4th 1129, 23 Cal.Rptr.3d 306, 104 P.3d 107 Pg. 321 |
Defendant stole a car and engaged in a high speed car chase with officers, which resulted in his running a red light, hitting another car, and killing the driver and severely injuring the passenger. On appeal, defendant asks the court to consider the requirements for the second-degree felony rule. | "In determining whether a felony is inherently dangerous [under the second degree felony-murder rule], the court looks to the elements of the felony in the abstract, not the particular facts of the case, i.e., not to the defendant's specific conduct. . . . That is, [it determines] whether the felony by its very nature cannot be committed without creating a substantial risk that someone will be killed." |
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People v. Robertson Supreme Court of California, 2004 34 Cal.4th 156, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 604, 95 P.3d 872 Pg. 328 |
Defendant shot and killed victims when he discovered them removing the hubcaps from his car. The court seeks to determine whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury that defendant could be found guilty of second degree felony murder if the killing was committed in the course of discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner. | "Except as otherwise authorized by law, any person who willfully discharges a firearm in a grossly negligent manner which could result in injury or death to a person is guilty of a public offense and shall be punished by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or by imprisonment in the state prison. . . [Additionally,] the merger rule is premised upon the concern that it would subvert the legislative intent for a court to apply the felony-murder rule automatically to elevate all felonious assaults resulting in death to second degree murder even where the felon does not act with malice." |
